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The high cost of prescription drugs in the United States is a problem that has engendered much political
attention. One proposed solution to the prescription drug problem is to permit reimportation of U.S.-made
drug products, allowing Americans to take advantage of products sold at lower prices abroad. In 2000, the
United States passed such a measure known as the Medicine Equity and Drug Safety Act (“MEDSA”),
which, if implemented, would have overturned a decade-long bad on the reimportation of pharmaceuticals
without the consent of the manufacturer. Though supported by many consumer advocates and politicians,
MEDSA would have had tenuous aﬀect on drug prices and posed unnecessary risks to consumer safety. Reim-
portation’s theoretic results of eliminating geographic price discrimination would have detrimental results
for society as a whole by reducing the incentive for drug manufacturers to innovate. Furthermore, a global
pricing system for pharmaceuticals may create severe consumer losses, especially in developing counties.
Lastly, reimportation of patented goods may be subject to legal challenge under current construction of the
exhaustion of rights principle. Rather than considering reimportation, the government should implement a
policy that provides lower-cost drugs to those who need them the most, the uninsured elderly. A policy of
price discounts for uninsured elderly would improve the prescription drug situation without threatening the
incentives for pharmaceutical innovation, and would lead to greater social beneﬁts overall.
1Introduction
The increasing cost of patented pharmaceuticals is an explosive issue that has captured the attention of
the elderly community, consumer advocates, the pharmaceutical industry and lawmakers in recent years.
In the United States, the outcry against high prescription drug prices is fueled by the fact that many of
such products are sold in other countries far more cheaply than at home. One proposed solution to the pre-
scription drug problem is to permit reimportation of U.S.-made drug products, allowing Americans to take
advantage of products sold at lower prices abroad. In 2000, the United States passed such a measure known
as the Medicine Equity and Drug Safety Act (“MEDSA”),1 which, if implemented, would have overturned a
decade-long bad on the reimportation of pharmaceuticals without the consent of the manufacturer. Though
the Secretary of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) has refused to implement MEDSA on public safety
grounds, the issue of reimportation as a way to combat the high cost of prescription drugs remains hotly
debated. Proponents of reimportation argue that it is a means by which consumers can obtain the same
products for the cheapest price. Those opposed to reimportation of drugs eschew concerns about the safety
of such products. The heart of the matter, though not as frequently discussed by politicians, is the proper
role of intellectual property in the global pharmaceutical market.
This article explores the reimportation controversy and the national and international implications of a U.S.
pharmaceutical reimportation policy. Part I describes the United States’ original decision to ban reimporta-
tion and how reimportation emerged recently on the U.S. political scene as a possible solution to the high cost
of prescription drugs. Part II provides a background on intellectual property theory and parallel imports, the
broader category of trademarked, copyrighted and patented goods that are imported without the permission
of the authorized manufacturer, with a focus on the pharmaceutical industry. Part III describes the domestic
and international legal treatment parallel imports, noting that recent judicial developments cast doubt upon
the legality of the reimportation of patented goods into the United States. Part IV examines implications of
a reimportation policy on the domestic and global drug market, concluding that not only will reimportation
detrimentally aﬀect the incentives for innovation in the pharmaceutical industry, but will potentially lead
to greater consumer losses, especially in developing countries. Part V discusses various alternative solutions
to the prescription drug problem, and proposes price discounts for seniors as a way of increasing access to
drugs without curbing incentives for pharmaceutical innovation.
I.
Pharmaceutical Reimportation in the United States
Reimportation has only recently emerged in the spotlight as politicians have confronted the increasing frus-
tration of the American public with the cost prescription drugs. The following sections will describe the
United States’ historical approach of banning reimportation for pharmaceutical products and how reimpor-
tation came about as a possible solution to the high cost of prescription drugs.
1Pub. L. No. 106-387 § 745, 114 Stat. 1549 (codiﬁed at 21 U.S.C. § 384 (2000)) [hereinafter MEDSA].
2A.
The PDMA
In the United States, the reimportation of drugs by entities other than the original manufacturer is prohibited
under the Prescription Drug Marketing Act of 1987 (“PDMA”).2 The purpose of the PDMA is to control
the distribution of prescription drugs in order to minimize the risk that consumers received “mislabeled,
subpotent, adulterated, expired, or counterfeit pharmaceuticals.”3 The PDMA limits the following channels
of distribution: 1) the reimportation of drugs, 2) the resale of drugs purchased by health care entities, 3)
the distribution of drug samples, and 4) the wholesale distribution of drugs interstate.4
At the time of the PDMA’s passage, lawmakers focused primarily on consumer safety and protection.
Congress presented ﬁndings that reimported drugs posed a risk to the American public because in the
process of foreign shipping and handling, drugs could become subpotent or adulterated.5 Congress further
found that a ready market for parallel imports allowed a cover for fraudulent practices and made the impor-
tation of counterfeit drugs easier.6
The PDMA provides that “no [prescription drug] which is manufactured in a State and exported may be
imported into the United States unless the drug is imported by the person who manufactured the drug.”7 An
exception is made for the customary practice of manufacturers to recall their own drugs.8 The PDMA also
allows an exception for the Secretary of Health and Human Services to authorize reimportation in emergency
situations.9
B.
The Rising Costs of Prescription Drugs
The arguments for allowing reimportation primarily come from consumer and elderly advocacy groups de-
crying the high cost of prescription drugs in the United States. Because Medicare does not cover outpatient
prescription drug use,10 the ﬁnancial burden on consumers can be large. In 2000, HHS issued a study at
2Pub. L. No. 100-293, 102 Stat. 95 (codiﬁed at 21 U.S.C. § 381(d) (2000)) [hereinafter PDMA]; see also William Davis,
The Medicine Equity and Drug Safety Act of 2000: Releasing Gray Market Pharmaceuticals, Tul. J. Comp. & Int’l. L., 483,
485 (2001). In 1999, manufacturers reimported over $13 billion dollars worth of drugs back to the United States, largely from
the United Kingdom and Germany. Michael D. Dalzell , Prescription Drug Reimportation: Panacea or Problem?, Managed
Care, Dec. 2000, available at http://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/0012/0012.reimport.html.
3S. Rep. No. 100-303, at 1 (1988).
4Id. at 1.
5PDMA, supra note 2, at § 2(4).
6Id. at § 2(5).
7Id. at § 3.
8S. Rep. No. 100-303, at 3 (1988).
9PDMA, supra note 2, § 3.
10HHS, Prescription Drug Coverage, Spending, Utilization, and Prices 1 (2000), available at
http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/drugstudy/. There are certain exceptions for chemotherapy and anti-transplant re-
jection drugs. Id.
3the request of President Clinton that surveyed pharmaceutical pricing and spending for groups with and
without prescription drug coverage.11 The study reported that in 1996, nearly a third of Medicare recipients
did not have prescription drug coverage for at least one month, and 47% of beneﬁciaries lacked prescription
drug coverage at some point during the year.12 Furthermore, Medicare recipients without another source of
prescription drug coverage spent more than twice the portion of their incomes on prescription drugs than
those with coverage.13 For the 20% of beneﬁciaries with the highest drug spending, the diﬀerence in percent
of income spent on prescription drugs for those with and without coverage was 2.6% and 8.1%, respectively.14
Of some signiﬁcance is the fact that within the group of uncovered high prescription drug spenders, those
persons below the poverty line spent 27.8% of their incomes on prescription drugs in 1996.15 The study
also found that 16.4% of those without prescription drug coverage did not purchase needed medicines in
1997 due to their high costs; for those at and near poverty levels, the percentage was greater than 20%.16
Those without prescription drug coverage were also often prescribed diﬀerent types of drugs from those with
coverage.17
The HHS study found that overall spending on prescription drugs has risen dramatically.18 In 1990, U.S.
prescription drug expenditures were $37.7 million.19 By 1998, the ﬁgure was $90.6 million, with the great-
est increase occurring in the years immediately proceeding.20 As a proportion of overall health care costs,
prescription drugs rose from 5.4 % to 7.9% between 1990 and 1998.21 Though there are many possible
explanations for the signiﬁcant rise of prescription drug costs, including the substitution of drug therapies
for other types of in-patient treatments,22 they do not diminish the increasing impact on those without
prescription drug coverage.
The increasing cost of prescription drugs has engendered deep frustration from the public, which has de-
manded that the government address the problem. Political pressure for action is intense; in the words of
one commentator “the cost of prescription drugs was the leading issue on every candidate’s lips” in the 2000
elections.23 Though the Clinton Administration proposed in 1999 to include a prescription drug beneﬁt in
Medicare, Congress could not agree to such a plan.24 The clash between Republicans, who wanted beneﬁts
through private insurers, and Democrats, who wanted a program incorporated into Medicare, resulted in an
impasse on any prescription drug beneﬁt plan.25 Instead, Congress passed MEDSA, discussed below.
States are also beginning to take measures to alleviate medicine costs for their citizens. As of this writing,
11Id. at 2.
12Id. at 21 tbl.1-1, 23 ﬁg.1-1. Thirty-nine million Americans are currently Medicare beneﬁciaries, See Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services, Medicare Basics, at http://www.medicare.gov/Basics/Overview.asp. Medicare oﬀers health insurance
to the U.S. elderly population over 65. Id.
13HHS, Prescription Drug Coverage, Spending, Utilization, and Prices, supra note 10, at 70 tbl.2-19. For those under
65, the average expenditure for prescriptions drugs is.4% of income. Id. at 77 tbl.2-25.
14Id. at 70 tbl.2-19.
15Id. at 70 tbl.2-19.
16Id. at 82 tbl.2-27, 2-28. This ﬁgure applies to persons with incomes 100-150% times the poverty level without Medicaid
coverage. Id.
17Id. at 82 - 83, 118 tbl.3-4.
18Id. at 83.
19Id. at 85 tbl.2-29.
20Id. The dollar amounts are in nominal terms and therefore reﬂect inﬂation. Id. at 84. Controlling for inﬂation, however,
the increase in amount spent on drugs has been signiﬁcant. Id. at 84 ﬁg.2-14.
21Id. at 85 tbl.2-29.
22Id. at 85.
23Spencer Rich, Politics, As Usual, Rules Health Agenda, 32 Nat. Journal 3968 (2000).
24Catherine Cowan, Mixing Politics and Prescriptions; Maine Has Passed, and Other States Considering, a Law Permitting
Prescription Drug Controls, St. Government News, Jan. 1, 2001, at 10.
25Rich, supra note 23, at 3968.
4thirty-seven states have legislation under consideration that would institute buying clubs, bulk purchasing,
and other measures to handle the soaring cost of prescription drugs.26 In May of 2000, Maine passed a law,
the ﬁrst of its kind, to allow the state to control drug prices if the industry did not lower them signiﬁcantly
by 2003.27 That same year, the Vermont Senate also threatened price controls if the pharmaceutical industry
did not lower its prices.28 Florida and Michigan recently passed legislation providing preferential treatment
for state purchases to lower-priced drugs.29 Massachusetts and Maine have passed laws that would allow
them to purchase medicines in bulk that are sold at lower prices to prisons, hospitals, and Medicard recip-
ients.30 The pharmaceutical industry objects to these policies as forms of price controls, and is defending
itself with lawsuits to stymie these eﬀorts.31 How the legal battles play out will be an important indication
of the nation’s evolving attitude toward the pharmaceutical industry.
C.
The Reimportation Debate
At the beginning of the discourse on policy options to alleviate the costs of drugs for the elderly, lawmakers
focused primarily on whether Medicare should include a prescription drug beneﬁt. The focus shifted, how-
ever, when stories of elderly persons traveling in caravan to Mexico and Canada in search of lower-cost drugs
prompted attention from lawmakers.32 By 2001, Congressional candidates from at least eleven states had
chartered buses to take people to Canada or Mexico to buy prescription drugs as a form of public protest.33
1.
Proposed Reimportation Policies
Public attention to the increasing cost of prescription drugs culminated in several attempts in year 2000
to introduce legislation that would allow pharmaceutical reimportation.34 The issue of reimportation in-
26Robin Toner, Rising Drug Costs a Powerful Issue for National and State Politicians, N. Y. Times, Apr. 1, 2002.
27Cowan, supra note 24, at 10.
28Price Controls are a Possibility in Vermont, Chain Drug Review, Apr. 10, 2000, at RX 7.
29Garry Boulard, The War on Drug—Prices: States Are Taking Up the Fight to Reduce Prescription Drug Costs, St.
Legislatures, Mar. 1, 2002, at 12.
30Cowan, supra note 24, at 10.
31Id.; Boulard, supra note 29, at 12. Some commentators believe that a reduction in proﬁts would primarily aﬀect investiga-
tional drugs with little social beneﬁt, and that it would be highly unlikely for pharmaceutical companies to cut back on research
and development with potentially “important therapeutic advantages, since they are the lifeblood of the industry.” Daniel A.
Hussar, Is There a Better Solution for the Pharmaceutical Price Problem? Drug Topics, Nov. 6, 2000, at 10.
32Andrew Phillips & Brenda Branswell, “The Canadian Connection”: New England Looks North to Import Cheap Prescrip-
tion Drugs, McCleans, Feb. 28, 2000, at 28.
33Cowan, supra note 24, at 10.
34Davis, supra note 2, at 485.
5curred a cast of illustrious characters on both sides of the debate. Noteworthy in the list of proponents of
a reimportation bill was Hillary Clinton, then running for the U.S. Senate, who supported a measure to
allow reimportation of approved drugs from Canada.35 Representative Marion Berry (D-Ark), supported a
broader measure that would allow importation and reimportation from a number of countries.36 Represen-
tative Tom Coburn (R-Ok) stated, “[d]rug reimportation is a market-based solution to the problem of the
rising cost of drugs.”37 President Clinton also supported reimportation, saying “I think it’s wrong when
drug companies sell the same drugs for a much higher price at home than they do overseas—even when those
drugs are manufactured right here in America.”38 It is interesting to note the bipartisan political support for
reimportation—liberals see reimportation as a means to increase access to medical care, and conservatives
see it is a way of dealing with the prescription drug issue without resorting to entitlement programs by
instead using so-called “market-based” policies to lower costs.
Opponents of reimportation bills relied on public safety arguments to try to prevent such a measure from
passing. The most vocal opposition to such bills came from members of the pharmaceutical industry. The
Pharmaceuticals Research and Manufacturers of America (“PhRMA”) stated that Congress should “stop
[reimportation] legislation before it can harm patients.”39 The Biotechnology Industry Organization Presi-
dent Carl B. Feldbaum charged that these measures were political “quick ﬁxes” that jeopardized the safety
of the inﬁrm and elderly in the name of improving access to drugs.40 Representative John Dingell (D-Mich),
the author of the PDMA, argued that a reimportation bill would leave the public vulnerable to adulterated or
misbranded drugs, stating, “we must never forget that the safety and well-being of Americans comes ﬁrst.”41
All Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) Commissioners since 1969 wrote to members of Congress oppos-
ing reimportation due to the potential public health risks, a fact publicized by the pharmaceutical industry;
later, however, former Commissioner David Kessler decided to support a reimportation measure.42 Some
citizen advocacy groups also opposed reimportation. The Seniors Coalition, while approving of the spirit of
these proposals, feared that the compromise of FDA’s “gold standard” in safety and eﬃcacy would lead to
increased risks to seniors.43 The group instead advocated prescription drug coverage under Medicare.44
35Barbara J. Saﬃr, Hillary Prescribes Importing of Drugs; Would Lower Medication Costs, She Says, Wash. Times, Feb. 9,
2000, at A3.
36Rep. Marion Berry, Relieving the Burden of High-Priced Medicine, The Hill, Sep. 12, 2001, at 46.
37Rep. Tom Coburn, M.D., Drug Reimportation Will Drive Down Costs, The Hill, Sep. 20, 2000.
38Tentative Agreement Will Allow Reimport of U.S.-Made Drugs, Chemical Market Rep., Oct. 2, 2000, at 29.
39Former FDA Chiefs Blast Import Proposal, Chain Drug Rev., Sep. 25, 2000, at RX 33.
40BIO: Reimportation of Prescription Drugs Puts Patients at Risk, PR Newswire, July 18, 2000.
41Rep. John D. Dingell, Coburn and Crowley Amendments Pose Risks, The Hill, Sep. 20, 2000.
42Eleven Former FDA Commissioners Warn of Dangers of Drug Reimportation To American Patients, Reports PhRMA;
Every Living Former FDA Commissioner Since 1969 Says Reimportation is Dangerous, PR Newswire, Aug. 31, 2000; Former
FDA Chief Now in Favor or Reimporting Rxs, Drug Topics, Oct. 2, 2000, at 10. Kessler stated in his reversal: “U.S. licensed
pharmacists and wholesalers—who know how drugs must be stored and handled and who would be importing them under the
strict oversight of the FDA—are well positioned to satisfy import quality products rather than having American consumers do
this on their own.” Id.
43Seniors Coalition Calls on Senate to Reject Drug Reimportation Amendments to Supplemental Agriculture Appropriations
Bill, U.S. Newswire, Aug. 2, 2000.
44Id.
62.
MEDSA
The result of this debate was the MEDSA, which was passed as part of the 2001 agricultural appropria-
tions bill.45 MEDSA attempts to counter the high costs of prescription drugs by allowing reimportation of
drugs that are shown not to pose a public health risk. It amends the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act
(“FDCA”)46 to allow the Secretary of HHS to promulgate regulations allowing pharmacists and wholesalers
to reimport U.S. manufactured products, and prohibits contracts restricting the reimportation of drugs by
the manufacturer.47 MEDSA addresses the public safety issue by requiring that the reimported drugs meet
FDA approval standard and by setting forth detailed labeling and testing requirements for reimporters.48 It
appropriates $23 million dollars for the FDA to implement the requirements of the Act.49
PhRMA criticized the Act, stating that it was full of loopholes and would put American consumers at
risk.50 Democrats accused the pharmaceutical industry for gutting the bill, creating the very loopholes
that undermined its eﬀectiveness.51 According to MEDSA, drugs can initially be imported from Europe,
Canada, Japan and Australia, but not from Mexico and Latin America as some Democrats had hoped.52
Furthermore, though contracts prohibiting parallel importation are disallowed under MEDSA, it would allow
contracts that prohibited sale of reimported drugs below U.S. prices.53 Though President Clinton believed
that MEDSA represented “little more than a false promise to the American public,” he nonetheless signed
the bill into law on October 28, 2000.54
Perhaps the only group that wholeheartedly endorsed MEDSA was the National Community Pharmacists
Association (“NCPA”).55 Calvin Anthony, executive vice-president of the NCPA stated that MEDSA was
“a high victory for the nation’s independent pharmacists,” allowing them to purchase prescription drugs a
lower cost and passing those costs on to consumers.
Under Section 804(l) MEDSA does not become eﬀective until the Secretary of HHS issues ﬁndings that there
will be no adverse health eﬀects and approves the bill.56 Upon the passage of MEDSA, then Secretary Donna
Shalala refused to implement the bill, and in 2001 Secretary Tommy Thompson issued a letter to Congress
reaﬃrming her decision.57 In his letter, Secretary Thompson expressed safety concerns about allowing drug
45H.R. Rep. No. 106-948, at 38 (2000). MEDSA was passed as section 745 of Public Law 106-387, making appropriations
for Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies programs for the ﬁscal year ending
September 30, 2001. Id.
4621 U.S.C. §§ 301-397 (1999).
47MEDSA, supra note 1, at §§ 804(a), 804(h).
48Id. at §§ 804(b)-(e).
4921 U.S.C. § 333(e).
50Congress Passes, President to Sign Drug Reimportation Bill, Critics Minimize Law’s Eﬀect, Med. Marketing and
Media, Nov. 1, 2000, at 8.
51Glenn Hess, Democrats Accuse Pharma Industry of Gutting Drug Reimportation Bill, Chemical Market Rep., Oct. 16,
2000, at 1.
52Congress Passes, President to Sign Drug Reimportation Bill, Critics Minimize Law’s Eﬀect, supra note 50, at 8; see
MEDSA, supra note 1, at § 804(f).
53Glenn Hess, Democrats Accuse Pharma Industry of Gutting Drug Reimportation Bill, Chemical Market Rep., Oct. 16,
2000, at 1.
54James G. Dickinson, Clinton Signs Drug Reimport Bill, Med. Marketing & Media, Dec. 1, 2000, at 38.
55James Frederick, Drug Importation Bill Passes, Drawing Praise From NCPA, Drug Store News, Oct. 30, 2000, at 15.
56MEDSA, supra note 1, at § 804(l).
57Secretary Tommy Thompson, U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services Response to Sen. James Jeﬀords on Drug
Reimportation (July 9, 2001), available at http://www.fda.gov/oc/apo/thompson/medsact.html.
7products back in the U.S. market that had not been subject to FDA oversight.58 He doubted the cost savings
that would result from the bill, noting that reimportation might not occur under the costly administrative
regime envisioned by MEDSA.59 In expressing dismay at the fact that MEDSA was never implemented,
NCPA president John Carson stated: “Millions of Americans are crossing our nation’s border—both phys-
ically and via the internet—to purchase prescription drugs at lower prices with little or no assurance of
safety.”60
3.
State Reimportation Measures
Reimportation measures have also been considered by a number of New England state governments even
though under the PDMA and FDCA this would be illegal.61 The Vermont Senate in 2000 considered a
plan to allow Canadian pharmacists to ﬁll prescriptions issued by Vermont doctors in exchange for opening
up New England hospitals for treatment of Quebec citizens.62 New Hampshire and Maine have discussed
similar arrangements with Quebec oﬃcials.63
4.
Post-MEDSA Reimportation Amendments
In response the Bush administration’s refusal to implement MEDSA, lawmakers proposed amendments to
the 2002 agricultural appropriations bill to attempt to get a reimportation measure through. HR 2330,
sponsored by Representative Bernie Sanders (I-VT), would have prevented the FDA from enforcing the ban
on the reimportation of FDA approved pharmaceuticals.64 An eﬀort at reviving the defunct MEDSA, the
bill failed in the House.65 Another bill, sponsored by Representative Gil Gutknecht (R-Minn), allowing
reimportation by individual consumers for personal use, passed in the House by a wide margin.66 A House
58Id.
59Id.
60Michael F. Conlan, How Safe is the Drug Supply? Reports of Counterfeit Drugs and the Growth of E-tailing are Fanning
Concerns about Drug Quality, Drug Topics, Oct. 15, 2001, at 32.
61Phillips & Branswell, supra note 32, at 28.
62Price Controls are a Possibility in Vermont, Chain Drug Review, Apr. 10, 2000, at RX 7; Phillips & Branswell, supra
note 32, at 28.
63Id. at 28.
64Dana A. Elﬁn, House Reimportation Amendment Fails; Personal Use Exemp-
tion Amendment Passes, Pharmaceutical L. & Pol’y, July 19, 2001, available at
http://subscript.bna.com/SAMPLES/plp.nsf/85256269004a99228525625400656cb3/fdb35968676d2ef185256a8d0073ddf9?OpenDocument.
65Id.
66Id.
8Panel later removed the amendment, ending the drug reimportation debate for at least the near future.67 In
the wake of the September 11 events, some believed that U.S. adoption of another reimportation measure
was “virtually dead” due to fears of contamination by terrorists.68 However, in April 2002, Senator Byron
Dorgan (D-ND) stated that he planned to renew eﬀorts for an importation bill from Canada.69
Though MEDSA’s life was short-lived and it is unclear whether another reimportation measure will take its
place in the future, it shows that the American political climate is warming towards the idea of reimportation
as an answer to the public’s frustrations with the cost of prescription drugs. It is a seemingly convenient and
cost-free solution to the problem and attracts both liberals and conservatives alike. Though safety concerns
dominated the MEDSA debate and ultimately won the day, the real concern with reimported drugs, and
parallel imports in general, lies in their impacts on the domestic and global drug markets.
II.
Parallel Imports and Pharmaceuticals
The primary underlying issue of a reimportation policy, though not entirely obvious and rarely addressed by
politicians, is the role of intellectual property law in the pharmaceutical industry. Though this article cannot
explore the many controversies surrounding this issue, the basic theme is the need to balance incentives for
the pharmaceutical industry to invent new and useful products while at the same time allowing the public
access to such goods. To ﬂesh out the implications of a reimportation measure, this Part will ﬁrst discuss
the law and theory underlying the most important aspect of intellectual property in the pharmaceutical in-
dustry, patent protection. It will then explain why pharmaceutical prices vary so widely between geographic
markets, and why this may not be such a bad thing for consumers.
A.
Patent Protection in the United States
Rather than traditional property law, which governs rights with regard to land or other goods, intellectual
property law provides the norms and guidelines for the protection and distribution of ideas. In the United
States, the federal protection of authorship and ideas has a basis in Art. I §8 of the U.S. Constitution, which
gives Congress the power “to promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” The
Founders saw the importance of a national intellectual property system, both to avoid problems of disputes
67Kristen Hallam, House Panel Drops Personal-Use Drug Importation, Bloomberg News, Nov. 8, 2001.
68Daniel B. Moskowitz, Washington Insight, Bus. & Health, Nov. 1, 2001, at 8.
69Toner, supra note 26.
9between state-granted intellectual property rights and to promote innovation throughout the nation.70
The Patent Act of 1952 provides broad statutory guidelines for granting patents. It states: “Whoever invents
or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements of
this title.”71 According to the Act, an inventor must give evidence of three substantive requirements in order
for a patent to be granted: that the invention is novel,72 that it is useful,73 and that it is nonobvious.74
Furthermore, the Act requires that the inventor disclose the invention in such a way that the public can
make use of it.75 Implicitly, the invention must also be of patentable subject matter.76 Together, these
substantive and procedural requirements make up the ﬁve elements of patentability. A patent is reviewed
by agents in the Patent and Trademark Oﬃce, who examine the claims in the patent application for novelty,
usefulness and nonobviousness. The process generally encompasses a number of rounds of revision, and takes
on average two to three years.77
Once a patent has been granted, the holder has a right to exclude others from making, using, selling, oﬀering
for sale, or importing the invention for the term of the patent.78 These rights are not aﬃrmative rights to
be able to make, use, sell, or import the invention to the patentholder—rather, the patent holder has a legal
claim against anyone who infringes these rights without permission.79 In the United States, patents that
were granted prior to 1995 have a term of 17 years from the date of issue. In accordance to the World Trade
Organization Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”), 80 after 1995,
patents granted have a life of 20 years from the date of application.81
B.
Patent Protection and Pharmaceuticals
A patent is a grant of a certain period of exclusivity during which the patent holder, usually the inventor,
has control of the use, distribution, and sale of an invention. The utilitarian justiﬁcation for patent rights
is that giving inventors a grant of a legal monopoly, during which time they may reap the rewards of their
70See Robert P. Merges et al., Intellectual Property in the New Technological Age 127 - 28 (2d. ed., 2000).
7135 U.S.C. § 101 (2001).
72Id. at § 102.
73Id. at § 101.
74Id. at § 103.
75Id. at § 112.
76Merges et al., supra note 70, at 131.
77Id. at 134.
78Id. at 133.
79See id. at 134. For instance, if someone has a patent to an invention, and another party patents an invention that utilizes
the ﬁrst invention as a component, the second inventor must still obtain permission to use the already patented inventions to
make his own invention. An aﬃrmative right to make the invention has not been granted with the grant of the patent.
80See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, April 15, 1995, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 31; 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994)
[hereinafter TRIPS].
81Merges et al., supra note 70, at 133.
10labor, provides a powerful incentive for socially beneﬁcial innovation.82 These rights, of course, may be
licensed to others for a price. According to utilitarian theory, the need for patents arises because inventions
are “free goods,” or goods that do not decline in value with any particular use and are diﬃcult to exclude
others from using.83 Without patent rights, inventors would not devote the time and resources that allow
them to create innovative products that are beneﬁcial to society as a whole.
In the pharmaceutical arena, where the costs of creating a new drug are high but the incremental costs
of producing the drug once invented are small, patent protection is of central importance.84 There are a
number of reasons for the high costs of creating a new drug. In the United States and many other countries,
pharmaceuticals are unique compared to other industries in terms of the protracted and intensive regulatory
requirements placed upon them for government approval. Furthermore, many drugs are partially developed
and then abandoned later in the research and development phase.85 Due to these factors, drugs tend to be
a riskier investment compared to other industries.86 The exact cost of drug development is the subject of
heated debate between activists, academics, and the pharmaceutical industry. Estimates range from $56.5
million to $802 million, depending on whether carrying costs of capital, the cost of research failures, and tax
deductions are included.87 Despite this debate, most commentators agree that the pharmaceutical industry
82Id. at 137. Economists have challenged the view of patents as monopolies in the area of pharmaceuticals. They argue that
due to the availability competing products, the limitations placed on the length and scope of patents by regulatory systems,
and brand loyalty substantially undercut the monopoly power of patents. Instead, they argue that patents should be viewed as
property. See Claude E. Barﬁeld and Mark A. Groombridge, Parallel Trade in the Pharmaceutical Industry , Implications for
Innovation, Consumer Welfare, and Health Policy, 10 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 185, 202-02 (1999).
83Id. at 201; W. Kip Viscusi et al., Economics of Regulation and Antitrust 820 (3d ed. 2000).
84Barﬁeld & Groombridge, supra note 82, at 208 - 10.
85See, e.g., Andrew Pollack, Despite Billions for Discoveries, Pipeline of Drugs Is Far From Full, N.Y. Times, Apr. 19,
2002.
86Office of Technology Assessment, Pharmaceutical R&D: Costs, Risks, and Rewards 47 (1993) [hereinafter Phar-
maceutical R&D].
87The pharmaceutical industry often cites a ﬁgure of $500 million for the pre-tax cost of developing a new medicine, derived
from a study in 1991 by the Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development. See, e.g., PhRMA, Pharmaceutical Industry
Profile 17 (2001) (citing an analysis by the Boston Consulting Group based an a study by J.A. DiMasi et al.). The original
1991 analysis by DiMasi estimated the cost of developing a new drug to be $231 million in 1997 dollars. The estimate includes
the opportunity costs, or carrying cost of capital, for the duration of development as well as research failures. See, e.g., id.
at 17 (2001). The ﬁgure also includes out of pocket discovery, preclinical development, and clinical trial costs. Tufts Center
for the Study of Drug Development, A Methodology for Counting Costs for Pharmaceutical R&D 1 - 3 (2001), available at
http://www.tufts.edu/med/csdd/images/StudyMethodology.pdf.
The $500 million ﬁgure was challenged by a study by Public Citizen in 2001, which produced its own study based on
the 1991 Tufts study and a report by the Oﬃce of Technology Assessment. Public Citizen, Rx R&D Myths: The Case
Against the Drug Industry’s R&D “Scare Card” (2001), available at http://dev.citizen.org/documents/ACFDC.PDF,
citing Office of Technology Assessment, Pharmaceutical R&D: Costs, Risks, and Rewards (1993), available at
http://www.wws.princeton.edu/∼ota/disk1/1993/9336 n.html. Public Citizen’s study attacked the numbers from the phar-
maceutical industry and the Tufts Study on a number of grounds: the inclusion of opportunity costs, which Public Citizen
argues should not be included since opportunity costs do not represent actual cash outlay; the use of pre-tax dollars, rather than
including substantial tax deductions in the cost; and the focus on “new chemical entities” versus all drugs brought to market.
Public Citizen, supra, at 3-4. The Public Citizen study also pointed to high pharmaceutical proﬁts as an indication of the
fact that drug development is not, in fact, a risky business. Id. at 11. Revising the estimates based in its own methodology,
Public Citizen arrived at a ﬁgure of $56.6 million. Id. at 6.
Soon thereafter, the Tufts Center issued an update to its 1991 study, using similar methodology, with a new estimate of
$802 million dollars for drug development. Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development, News Release: Tufts Cen-
ter for the Study of Drug Development Pegs Cost of a New Prescription Medicine at $802 Million 1 (2001), available at
http://www.tufts.edu/med/csdd/images/NewsRelease113001pm.pdf. The estimate is in 2000 dollars, and includes the cost of
failures and opportunity costs of the potential return of the capital spent on research and development. Id. at 2. Compared to
the Center’s 1991 estimate of $231 million, the new ﬁgure was a 250% real increase in drug development costs. Id. (estimate in
1987 dollars). The study’s principal investigator, Dr. Joseph A. DiMasi, attributed this to an increase in the costs of clinical
trials, particularly for the study of drugs aﬀecting chronic and degenerative diseases. Id. at 2. According to the study, the
11is a particularly capital- and research-intensive one.88
The combination of the high cost of drug development and the low cost of copying drugs creates a market
failure in which, without government intervention, few would make the investment to produce such goods
and a socially suboptimal level of invention would result.89 Patents provide one solution to this market
failure by creating a legal right in the inventive information that allows the owner to exclude others, and
thus charge prices above competitive prices (obtaining so-called monopoly rents).
The optimal length of a patent is theoretically the amount of time required to obtain a return that will
provide enough incentive for an inventor to create a beneﬁcial invention.90 As the expected patent life of a
drug is limited by the time it takes for the FDA to approve the drug as safe and eﬀective, 91 pharmaceutical
companies typically enjoy less exclusivity that other industries. Because of the long delay between patent
application and FDA marketing approval, Congress passed the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Extension Act of 1984,92 which allows new drugs to receive patent term extensions of up to ﬁve years. Once
a drug’s patent expires, it may then be manufactured and sold by generic drug companies. The resulting
competition by generic companies leads the prices generally to drop signiﬁcantly.
Though a patent system was important enough to warrant constitutional protection, the need to provide
incentives for innovation must also be balanced with the need for the dissemination of beneﬁcial goods and
information to the public. The patent system tries to strike this balance in two ways. First, when a patent
is registered, the information held within it describing the invention is made freely available to the public
(although the practice of the invention is, of course, protected). Second, the term of the patent allows the
patent holder to extract monopoly rents for a limited period of time, after which others may make or use
the product with impunity. Though patent protection is theoretically meant to help society overall, granting
patents that are too long in duration or too broad in scope may counteract the beneﬁcial aspects of patent
protection.
There are a number of criticisms against the strong intellectual property protection in the United States
that ultimately allows the pharmaceutical industry to charge such high prices for prescription drugs. The
public ﬁnds it diﬃcult to understand why the United States has been reluctant to intervene on high drug
prices when it funds a large amount of basic science research that eventually leads to pharmaceutical prod-
ucts.93 Further, a number of commentators believe that patent protection has been the primary barrier to
the distribution of desperately needed drugs, especially in the case of AIDS drugs in sub-Saharan Africa.94
These critics, though rarely advocating an absolute denial of intellectual property protection, would limit it
through compulsory licensing95 or shorter patent terms.
growth rate for capitalized clinical costs was more than ﬁve times greater than the growth rate for pre-clinical research and
development costs. Id.
88See, e.g., Alan M. Fisch, Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceutical Patents: An Unreasonable Solution to an Unfortunate
Problem, 34 Jurimetrics J. 295, 302-304 (1994); Barﬁeld & Groombridge, supra note 82, at 208 - 10.
89Barﬁeld & Groombridge, supra note 82, at 201.
90For an economic discussion of optimal patent life, see Viscusi et al., supra note 83, at 806 – 10.
91Pharmaceutical R&D, supra note 86, at 82.
92Pub. L. 98- 417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codiﬁed at 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2000)).
93See, e.g., Public Citizen, supra note 87, at 7 - 10.
94See, e.g., Rosalyn S. Park, International Drug Industry: What the Future Holds for South Africa’s HIV/AIDS Patients,
11 Minn. J. Global Trade 125 (2002).
95See, e.g., Mary K. Schug, Promoting Access to HIC/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan Africa Within the Framework
of International Intellectual Property Law, 19 Law & Ineq. 229 (2001).
12C.
Deﬁnition of Parallel Imports
Parallel imports, also referred to as “gray market” goods, are products that are produced by an authorized
manufacturer in one country and then exported to another country without permission of the manufacturer.96
This occurs in cases where the authorized dealer is selling the product at diﬀerent prices in diﬀerent countries.
When a product is sold at a lower price in a certain region, there is a market for those lower-priced goods in a
region where the good is normally priced higher. As an illustration, take a bottle of Chanel No. 5. Say that
all Chanel No. 5 is manufactured in the United States, but a one-ounce bottle sells in the Mexican market
for $40 and in the Canadian market for $60. There is an incentive to buy those bottles of Chanel No. 5 in
the Mexican market for $40 take them to Canada for proﬁt, thus resulting in another distribution channel to
the Canadian market. The term “parallel imports” refers to this second line of goods that is being imported
“parallel” to the authorized distribution from the United States to Canada.97 The term “reimportation”
refers to the narrower situation where the goods are imported to the original country of manufacture, in this
case the United States.98
Parallel imports are distinct from black market goods, which are the unauthorized production of trade-
marked, copyrighted, or patented goods. The manufacture of parallel imports is fully authorized. Instead,
the question with parallel imports is whether the original rightsholder has right to control the importation
or exportation of the goods after sale in a particular market.
D.
Signiﬁcance of Parallel Imports in the Pharmaceutical Industry
The issue of parallel imports is of increasing importance in the area of pharmaceuticals in large part due to
the drastic price diﬀerentials between prescription drugs sold in diﬀerent countries. For instance, a thirty
20mg pill supply of Prosilic, an anti-ulcer drug manufactured by Merck, cost $120.45 in the United States in
1999, but in Canada and Mexico sold for $51.60 and $34.50, respectively.99 The diﬀerences between prices
in nations that do not oﬀer patent protection for drug products is even more stark; for example, a 20 mg
tablet of Omeprazole sold for $2.91 in the U.S. and for $.06 in India.100
96See Warwick A. Rothnie, Parallel Imports 1, 68 n.208 (1993).
97Id. at 1.
98The debate on parallel importation of pharmaceuticals is primarily concerned with the reimportation of drugs manufactured
in the United States. Importation of drugs manufactured in other countries is limited under 21 U.S.C. § 381(a) - (c) (2002).
99Prescription Drugs with Foreign Labels, Prepared for Sen. Henry Waxman, Minority Staﬀ, Special Investigations Division,
Committee on Government Reform, U.S. House of Representatives, October 11, 2000, at 1. In Canada and Mexico, the drug
sells under the name “Losec.” Id.
100Keith E. Maskus, Parallel Imports in Pharmaceuticals: Implications for Competition and Prices in Developing
Countries 53 tbl.2 (2001) (Final Report for the World Intellectual Property Organization). The numbers refer to wholesale
prices. U.S. price refers to pills sold in 1996; India price refers to pills sold in 1997.
13A number of factors contribute to the diﬀerential pricing of drugs in diﬀerent markets, many of which are
outside the control of pharmaceutical manufacturers. Most importantly, the United States is one of the
few countries that do not regulate the prices of drugs.101 In Europe, for example, each country negotiates
prices with pharmaceutical companies to obtain the best price they can for their nationals.102 The United
States, on the other hand, has traditionally allowed the free market to dictate the costs of prescription drugs.
Other external factors that lead to geographically disparate pharmaceutical prices are the variance of patent
protection in diﬀerent countries and inﬂation and exchange rate diﬀerentials.103
The pricing practices that pharmaceutical manufacturers can control are also based on market factors such
as variation in income and tastes. In countries with more elastic demand for drugs, for example, the proﬁt-
maximizing price is lower.104 In addition, many drug companies have recently, in the wake of public outcry
over the lack of aﬀordable drugs in developing countries, created programs to oﬀer lower-priced or free drugs
to certain needy countries.105 For instance, Pﬁzer recently oﬀered Difulcan, a meningitis medication, at no
cost to South Africa for two years.106 Though one may question the motives of such programs, the result
is huge pricing diﬀerentials in the international market.107 Such programs may make it harder to justify
the high prices of drugs in the United States, and create further pressure on American health oﬃcials and
legislators to take action to reduce prescription drug prices.108
Proponents of parallel imports discount these reasons, citing corporate greed and extraction of the highest
possible proﬁts as the primary motivating factors. The following section will explain how diﬀerential pricing
may not reduce consumer welfare and, in fact, is beneﬁcial to society by reducing societal losses resulting
from monopoly pricing.
E.
Economic Analysis of Pharmaceutical Price Discrimination
The disparate pricing of pharmaceuticals between the United States and other countries that has engendered
much of the public outrage against U.S. prices is a form of price discrimination. Price discrimination is the
application of diﬀerent prices to diﬀerent markets for the same good—for instance, selling a theater ticket
at a lower price during a weeknight versus the weekend or oﬀering lower prices for senior citizens. Generally,
price discrimination refers to cases where producers charge higher prices to those who are willing to pay more
for the product. Geographic price discrimination of pharmaceuticals, the issue underlying reimportation,
has resulted in the wide disparity of prices described above.
101Davis, supra note 2, at 507.
102See Hugh Brett, Parallel Imports in Europe, Derwent Information (2000), at
http://www.derwent.com/ipmatters/features/parallel.html.
103International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Associations, Parallel Trade: Recipe
for Reducing Patients’ Access to Innovative and High Quality Medicines 1 (2000), available at
http://www.ifpma.org/pdﬁfpma/ParallelTrade.pdf; Barﬁeld & Groombridge, supra note 82, at 245 - 46.
104Davis, supra note 2, at 507.
105See Robert Lenzner, The Eﬀects Could be Devastating, Forbes, Nov. 27, 2000, at 156.
106Id.
107An ancillary issue is the heightened incentive for illegal arbitrage if prescription drugs are available at such lower prices in
developing countries in comparison to developed countries. See Bruce Stokes, No Easy Cure, 968 Nat’l J. 968 (2001).
108See id.
14Price discrimination is frowned upon in antitrust law as it typically shifts economic surplus from consumers
to producers. However, where intellectual property rights are involved, price discrimination, though certainly
beneﬁting producers, may not necessarily have an adverse eﬀect on consumers.109 This is in part because
patented drugs already have monopoly rights for the duration of the patent. Under this monopoly, the
patent holder may price the based product to maximize proﬁt, or where marginal revenue equals marginal
cost.110 The result is a price above the market equilibrium, creating a loss to consumers having to pay more
for the good, and a deadweight loss to society by preventing people who could aﬀord the good at the market
price, but cannot aﬀord the monopoly price, from buying the good.111 Our current patent system accepts
this tradeoﬀ between societal losses incurred from monopoly and the incentives necessary for producers to
innovate. The following ﬁgure is a typical depiction of the producer surplus (proﬁt), consumer surplus,112
and deadweight loss that results from monopoly pricing:
Figure 1: Monopoly
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Marginal Cost
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109William Fisher, Property and Contract on the Internet, 73 Chi.-Kent L. Rev., 1203, 1238 - 39 (1998).
110For a discussion of the derivation of this model, see Viscusi et al., supra note 83, 78 - 80.
111Losses to consumers due to paying higher prices are not losses to society because the producers gain.
112Consumer surplus is the diﬀerence between what a consumer is willing to pay for a good (their “personal price”) and the
price that it costs them.
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Price discrimination lowers the deadweight loss associated with monopoly power by allowing some consumers
to buy the goods at a cost that they can aﬀord. The ﬁgure below provides a depiction of the theoretical
eﬀects of price discrimination on consumer surplus, producer surplus, and deadweight losses:113
Figure 2: Price Discrimination Under Monopoly
Marginal Cost
113This ﬁgure is adapted from Fisher, supra note 109, at 1238; but see Donnelly, supra note 127, at 502 (noting that total
welfare increases only if greater quantity of the goods are sold).
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The eﬀect of price discrimination on consumer surplus, compared to the monopoly price scenario, is unknown—
either an increase or a decrease could occur. Deadweight loss decreases, while producer surplus increases.
Economic theory would hold that such result is ultimately helpful to society. The increase in producer
surplus is not considered a loss, but is a beneﬁt to society overall as it presents a positive incentive for
innovation.114
This analysis also applies to the discriminatory pricing of pharmaceuticals in diﬀerent countries. Since the
abilities to pay for drugs, in real terms, are very diﬀerent on average from country to country, the diﬀerence
in pricing roughly matches consumer willingness to pay. At the same time, much of the objection to high
pharmaceutical prices comes from the United States, which has the highest drug prices of any country and
the highest average willingness to pay for consumers. The reimportation issue arises because those U.S.
consumers with lower willingness to pay are priced out of the U.S. market, whereas they would be able to
aﬀord drugs sold at foreign prices. The geographic groupings for consumer willingness to pay is therefore
only approximate, and deadweight loss occurs in each market as consumers at the low end are priced out.
A graphical depiction of this may look as follows:
Quantity
Figure 3: Price Discrimination in Geographical Markets
114Fisher, supra note 109, at 1238.
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20As the ﬁgure shows, each geographic market has a separate demand curve based upon its inhabitants’
willingness to pay. The United States, the world’s largest market in drugs, has the highest average willingness
to pay for a drug as well as the highest prices. Country 2 represents a country with price controls that has
negotiated well for its drug prices such that consumer surplus exceeds deadweight loss by a large amount.
Country 3 represents a country that has negotiated poorly for its prices, leading to a large amount of
deadweight loss with respect to consumer surplus. Country 4 represents a developing country that has been
the recipient of drugs at the manufacturer’s marginal cost through a donation or philanthropic program.
Diﬀerential pricing reduces deadweight losses, leading ultimately to societal gains, either to consumers in
lower price markets who pay less, or to producers who gain from increased proﬁts, which ultimately pro-
vide further incentives to innovate beneﬁcial products for society. Though diﬀerential pricing according to
geographic markets does not correspond exactly to global willingness to pay, which would optimize results,
geographic markets are a good approximate, reducing deadweight losses that would occur if no price dis-
crimination were allowed.115 It is diﬃcult for the American consumer to fathom how it can help them that
pharmaceutical manufacturers are pricing medicines in foreign countries at half the cost they have to pay in
the United States, especially if they cannot aﬀord U.S. prices. Therefore, the proponents of reimportation
generally have little trouble convincing consumers and politicians that such pricing is inherently unfair and
harmful.
III.
Legal Treatment of Parallel Imports
U.S law and international treaties on the parallel imports, though not a focus of the reimportation debate,
have the potential play an important role. A key principle is the exhaustion of intellectual property rights,
which dictates the conditions under which a sale of a protected good results in loss of certain intellectual
property rights in that particular good to the original manufacturer. In the United States, the Supreme
Court has followed the principle of international exhaustion for copyrighted goods, allowing parallel impor-
tation under the ﬁrst sale doctrine. On the other hand, a recent Federal Circuit case applied the national
exhaustion principle to patented goods, limiting the ﬁrst sale doctrine to those goods sold ﬁrst in the United
States. The decision thus limits parallel imports and poses potential questions about the legality of reimpor-
tation policies. The European Union (“EU”), on the other hand, applies the doctrine of regional exhaustion
to parallel imports, allowing parallel imports throughout the EU for European products. International
agreements, such as TRIPS, adopt a primarily deferential approach, allowing each country to apply its own
policies on parallel imports. The following sections will attempt to provide an understanding of the divergent
approaches to parallel imports and the policies behind them.
115For a discussion of the eﬀects eliminating global price discrimination, see Section IV.A.
21A.
United States
Though patent protection is the most signiﬁcant source of protection for pharmaceutical products, a discus-
sion of U.S. copyright and trademark laws on parallel importation is helpful for understanding the diﬀerent
rationales behind each the diﬀering approaches. This section will delineate the U.S. approach to parallel
imports in copyrighted, trademarked, and patented goods.
1.
Copyrighted Goods
The latest word on the legality of parallel imports of copyrighted goods is Quality King Distributor, Inc.
v. L’Anza Research International, Inc.116 In L’Anza, the Supreme Court found that the reimportation
of hair products with copyrighted labels into the U.S. at a lower cost did not infringe upon the rights of
the copyright holder. Avoiding the policy implications of such a decision, the court relied upon a textual
interpretation of the applicable provisions of the Copyright Act. Section 109(a), which codiﬁes the ﬁrst sale
doctrine, states:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3), the owner of a particular copy ...lawfully made
under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the
copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy....117
The Court read this provision in conjunction with § 602(a), governing imports in copyrighted goods, which
states that:
Importation into the United States, without the authority of the owner of copyright under this
title, of copies or phonorecords of a work that have been acquired outside the United States is an
infringement of the exclusive right to distribute copies ...under section 106....118
The Court reasoned that because the prohibition on importation is directly linked to the exclusive right to
distribution granted under §106(3), which is limited by §109(a), the ﬁrst sale doctrine applies to imported
goods as well as domestic goods.119 U.S. copyright law thus follows the principle of international exhaustion,
meaning that a ﬁrst sale abroad can exhaust the right of the copyright holder to control the sale of the
good. Under this construction of the ﬁrst sale doctrine, copyright law does not limit the reimportation of
copyrighted goods.120
116Quality King Distributor, Inc. v. L’Anza Research International, Inc., 523 U.S. 135 (1998).
119L’Anza, 523 U.S. 144.
120Although Justice Ginsberg’s concurrence emphasizes that the holding does not extend to good manufactured abroad rather
than in the United States. Id. at 154.
222.
Trademarked Goods
The limitation on importation of trademarked goods comes from the Trademark Act and the Tariﬀ
Act.121 The Trademark Act Section 42 prohibits the import of products with marks that “copy or simulate”
a registered U.S. trademark.122 Section 526 of the Tariﬀ Act further prohibits the importation of goods of
foreign manufacture if such the goods bear the trademark of a U.S. entity, unless the owner has given written
permission.123 Prior to 1999, the Customs Service regulations under the Tariﬀ Act to allowed for exceptions
to the ban on parallel imports where: 1) the same entity owns the U.S. and foreign trademark; 2) the foreign
and domestic trademark owners are parent and subsidiary companies or are otherwise subject to common
ownership or control; or 3) goods manufactured abroad bear a recorded trademark or trade name applied
under authorization of the U.S. owner. In K-Mart Corporation v. Cartier, the U.S. Supreme Court struck
down the third exception, stating that regardless of whether the use of the trademark is authorized, goods
manufactured abroad are not exempt from the statute.124 A U.S. trademark owner therefore has the ability
to reject goods made abroad under the same authorized trademark. Later, in Lever Brothers Company v.
United States, the D.C. Circuit held that the second exception granting aﬃliates the right to import foreign-
manufactured goods under a U.S. registered trademark does not apply to goods that are physically diﬀerent
from the goods manufactured in the United States.125 In response to Lever, the Customs Service in 1999
revised its regulations to include a section on “Restricted Gray Market Goods,” and included a provision
that prohibits importation of goods manufactured by aﬃliates that are “physically or materially” diﬀerent
from the authorized product.126 Therefore, trademark law would prohibit the reimportation of goods only
if they were materially diﬀerent from the goods sold originally in the U.S.
3.
Patented Goods
Though historically U.S. law has not been entirely clear on the issue of exhaustion for patented goods, a recent
Federal Circuit case strongly asserted the principal of national exhaustion. As stated before, the Patent Act
grants patent holders the exclusive right to import the patented goods, and therefore it would seem that
the patent holder has the right to block reimportation of the good. However, this right is constrained by
121Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051 – 1127 (2000) [hereinafter Trademark Act]; Tariﬀ Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. 1304
– 168 [hereinafter Tariﬀ Act]. See also Tait R. Swanson, Combating Gray Market Goods in a Global Market: Comparative
Analysis of Intellectual Property Laws and Recommended Strategies, 22 Hous. J. Int’l L. 327, 332 (2000); Nancy T. Gallini
& Aidan Hollis, A Contractual Approach to the Gray Market, 19 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 1, 7 - 8 (1999).
122Trademark Act § 42; Rothnie, supra note 96, at 69.
123Tariﬀ Act § 526.
124K Mart Corporation v. Cartier, 486 U.S. 281, 293 - 94 (1988).
125Lever Brothers Company v. United States, 981 F.2d 1330, 1338 - 39 (1994).
12619 C.F.R. 133.23(3).
23the same exhaustion of rights principles as described with the ﬁrst sale doctrine of copyright law.127 An
important question is exactly how far the ﬁrst sale doctrine extends, as it is not codiﬁed in the Patent Act.
If the exhaustion occurs nationally, only sale within the U.S. will lead to the exhaustion of the patent right.
If exhaustion occurs internationally, U.S. patent holders may not have the right to block parallel imports.
In Boesch v. Graﬀ, decided in 1890, the Supreme Court ﬁrst announced the national exhaustion doctrine,
declaring illegal the importation of goods that were manufactured and ﬁrst sold abroad.128 However, in
Curtiss Aeroplane v. United Aircraft, the Second Circuit followed the international doctrine of exhaustion,
allowing the importation of planes manufactured abroad under an exclusive license grant by the patent
holder.129
The Federal Circuit recently reiterated the national exhaustion principle in Jazz Photo v. International
Trade Commission.130 In Jazz Photo, the defendant purchased used single-use cameras casing in the United
States, refurbished them abroad, and attempted to sell them back in the United States.131 In deciding on
the issue of whether importation of these refurbished cameras constituted infringement, one of the central
issues was the exhaustion of rights:
Underlying the repair/reconstruction dichotomy is the principle of exhaustion of the patent right.
The unrestricted sale of a patented article, by or with the authority of the patentee, exhausts the
patentee’s right to control further sale and use of that article by enforcing the patent under which
it was ﬁrst sold...United States patent rights are not exhausted by products of foreign provenance.
To invoke the protection of the ﬁrst sale doctrine, the authorized ﬁrst sale must have occurred under
the United States patent. 132
The court found that those cameras that had been sold by the authorized manufacturer in the United States
did not infringe upon the U.S. patent; however, those that were ﬁrst sold abroad did infringe.133
The decision of the Federal Circuit seems to resolve the issue of national versus international exhaustion
with regard to patented goods and provides legal ammunition to those who oppose pharmaceutical reimpor-
tation. On the other hand, the decisions of Curtiss Aeroplane and the L’Anza decision cut in the direction
of international exhaustion. If legal challenges to parallel imports of patented goods take place under Jazz
Photo, the Supreme Court may be required to settle the issue once and for all.
127See Darren E. Donnelly, Parallel Trade and International Harmonization of the Exhaustion of Rights Doctrine, 13 Santa
Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 445, 450 n.21 (1997); see, e.g., Jazz Photo Corp. v. International Trade Com’n, 264
F.3d 1094, 1105 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
128Boesch v. Graﬀ, 133 U.S. 697, 702 - 03 (1890).
129Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corp. v. United Aircraft Eng’g Corp., 266 F. 71 (2d Cir. 1920) (following Holiday v. Mattheson,
24 Fed. 185 (S.D.N.Y. 1885), which found valid the reimportation of goods manufactured in the United States and sold abroad
to without permission of the U.S. patent holder ).
130Jazz Photo v. Int. Trade Comm’n, 264 F.3d 1094, 1105 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citing Boesch, 133 U.S. at 701 - 03).
131Id. at 1098 – 1101.
133Id. at 1111.
244.
Interests Underlying Diﬀering Judicial Approaches
Though court decisions seem to vary widely on the issue of exhaustion, they indicate the diﬀerent underlying
principles behind intellectual property protection. In the case of the parallel importation of patented goods,
the Supreme Court has explained the ﬁrst sale doctrine in labor-desert terms, saying, “The test has been
whether or not there has been such a disposition of the article that it may fairly be said that the patentee
has received his reward for the use of the article.”134 In other words, the proﬁts received upon ﬁrst sale of
the patented good is all the inventor really deserves—any more would be unduly enriching the inventor and
wrongfully extending the grant of monopoly to the detriment of the public. Though not stated in L’Anza,
the free ﬂow of information for the beneﬁt of the public is also a strong concern in copyright law. On the
other hand, in the trademark area courts and legislators are most concerned with the consumer protection,
and little to no attention is paid toward the issue of the free ﬂow of goods. This is in part because much of
trademark law itself is consumer-oriented, rather than concerned with incentives and rewards, as copyright
and patent law are.
The competing interests of consumer protection, the free ﬂow of goods and incentive for invention come to
a head with the parallel importation of pharmaceuticals. Many of the drugs at issue are both patented and
utilize trademarks that make them recognizable to the public. The understanding of the heightened risks to
consumers through pharmaceutical products was the impetus of Congress’s passage of the PDMA. Congress
recognized the need for greater consumer protection in the area of drugs. However, neither Congress nor
the courts have addressed the utilitarian theory underlying patent law as a rationale for the prohibition on
pharmaceutical parallel imports, making measures to remove the prohibition rest solely on overcoming the
consumer protection justiﬁcation. By doing so, the primary hurdle for implementing a reimportation plan
has become the safety issue.135
B.
The European Approach of Regional Exhaustion
The EU takes a diﬀerent position on the parallel importation of protected goods, following the rule of “re-
gional” or “community” exhaustion.136 This means that a ﬁrst sale within any country in the EU will
exhaust the rights of the original rights holder, regardless of the fact that each country individually confers
its own set of rights when it grants them.137 The exhaustion is limited, however, by the rights holder’s
consent to the ﬁrst sale. If the article is sold without express or implicit authorization of the rights holder,
the rights are not exhausted.138 This bar appears to be relatively low—though sale under a compulsory
134United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 278 (1942).
135See Davis, supra note 2, at 510.
136Marleen Van Kerckhove & David Perkins, European Community and International Exhaustion: Shades of Grey, 671
PLI/Pat 93, 99 (2001).
137Id. at 99.
138Rothnie, supra note 96, at 125; Donnelly, supra note 127, at 476 - 77.
25license scheme would not exhaust a patent,139 the “simple fact of a lawful release on the foreign market”
would indicate consent.140
The legality of parallel importation of patented goods between member nations has important eﬀects on
the pharmaceutical trade in the EU. As prescription drug prices are ﬁxed by the government in the various
countries in Europe, the opportunity for buying drugs cheaply in one country, such as Greece, and reselling
them to another country, such as England, is quite attractive.141 The ability for such arbitrage of retail drug
prices within the EU is only limited by the requirement that the drugs be repackaged so that it can be re-sold
in another country.142 The availability of parallel imports in Europe has arguably had a large impact on the
pharmaceutical market: in the UK, over 10% of drugs sold are parallel imports, and Europe’s share of the
global pharmaceutical market has decreased from 32% in 1992 to 22% in 2002.143 The eﬀects are expected
to increase as more eastern bloc countries, with even lower pharmaceutical prices, join the EU. Though the
EU has at this time prioritized the notions of free trade above the objections of the pharmaceutical industry,
the eﬀect on consumers is yet to be deﬁnitively studied.
C.
International Agreements and Parallel Imports
Intellectual property pose challenges to the international trade regime: more industrialized countries want
greater intellectual property protection because they are more technologically enfranchised, whereas lesser
developed counties, where manufacturing is cheaper, prefer less stringent intellectual property protection.144
The recent trend in international agreements is oﬀering increased intellectual property protection as a whole.
However, these agreements have done little in the way of addressing the issue of parallel imports. Therefore,
the nations can adopt whatever policies they see ﬁt with regards to allowing parallel imports or not, so long
as they treat other nations in the same fashion.
139Id. at 474.
140Rothnie, supra note 96, at 125.
141Brett, supra note 102.
142Id.
143Ben Hirschler, Firms Step Up Attack on Low European Drug Prices, Reuters English News Service, Jan. 9, 2002,
available at http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/ip-health/2002-January/002566.html.
144Michael A. Ugolini, Gray Market Goods Under the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 12
Transnat’l Law. 451, 452 - 53 (1999).
261.
TRIPS
TRIPS incorporates basic approaches to international trade, including the rule of “national treatment,”
which requires that members treat other members no less favorably than it would its own citizens.145 In
addition, similar to the GATT and WTO agreements, TRIPS establishes “most favored nation” status for
member nations, meaning that if a member is granted the right to treat its nationals diﬀerently from those
of other members, it may not diﬀerentiate in its treatment of other nations, whether favorably or disfavor-
ably.146
The major provisions of TRIPS include: mandating intellectual property protection, establishing patent
rights for process and product patents, and establishing the conditions for compulsory licensing.147 Though
providing rather stringent intellectual property protection compared to previous bilateral and multilateral
treaties, in terms of parallel imports, TRIPS is highly deferential to the laws of the individual country. The
issue of exhaustion and territoriality is addressed directly in Article 6, which states: “For the purposes of
dispute settlement under this Agreement, subject to the provisions of Articles 3 and 4 nothing in this Agree-
ment shall be used to address the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual property rights.” Though TRIPS
requires border enforcement in countries to prevent the ﬂow of black-market goods, no such requirement
exists for parallel imports.148
2.
NAFTA
The North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”)149 contains a number of provisions heightening the
protection of intellectual property for rights holders in Mexico, Canada and the United States.150 NAFTA
does not address parallel imports or exhaustion of rights directly.151 Therefore, the issue parallel imports
remains up to the individual nation.152 Similar to TRIPS, NAFTA requires border enforcement of pirated
goods, but enforcement of parallel imports is the choice of the individual nation.153
145TRIPS, supra note 80, at art. 3; Ugolini, supra note 144, at 454.
146Id. at 455; TRIPS, supra note 80, at art. 4.
147Id. at arts. 27, 31; Ugolini, supra note 144, 459 - 60.
148TRIPS, supra note 80, at art. 51 n. 13; Ugolini, supra note 144, 461.
149North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 289 (containing chs. 1-9), 32 I.L.M. 605
(containing chs. 10- 22) (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
150Lars Noah, NAFTA’s Impact on the Trade in Pharmaceuticals, 33 Hous. L. Rev. 1293, 1298 - 99 (1997); see generally
NAFTA, supra note 149, ch. 17.
151Noah, supra note 150, at 1303.
152Charles S. Levy & Stuart M. Weiser, The NAFTA: A Watershed for Protection of Intellectual Property, 27 Int’l Law.
671 (1993).
153Id. at 671.
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Summary
The legal approach to parallel imports diﬀers from nation to nation. The U.S. treats diﬀerent types of goods
diﬀerently, allowing parallel imports for copyrighted goods, applying more restrictions in trademarked goods.
The recent decision of Jazz Photo reasserts the national exhaustion principle, disallowing parallel imports
of goods ﬁrst sold abroad. Thus, a United States policy to allow reimportation of pharmaceuticals may be
subject to legal challenge. The EU, on the other hand, allows parallel imports between member nations.
These various approaches are not clariﬁed or harmonized by international treaties.
IV.
Implications of Pharmaceutical Reimportation
Though the proponents of reimportation may have noble motives, notably, that of providing aﬀordable drugs
to the elderly inﬁrm who cannot aﬀord them, there are many compelling reasons why reimportation is not the
best solution to the high cost of prescription drugs. Though empirical evidence is scarce, following sections
will attempt to delineate the potential national and international implications of a U.S. reimportation policy.
A.
Prices and Supply
If a reimportation plan such as MEDSA is eﬀectuated in the United States, the eﬀects on prices is unclear. In
theory, unfettered reimportation,154 and parallel imports in general, will reduce the incentive for companies
to charge diﬀerent prices in diﬀerent markets because of the ability for intermediaries to buy in lower-price
markets and sell in higher-price markets. In a world without price discrimination, the company would
only issue drugs at one price. As described in Section II.E, the eﬀect of price discrimination is a certain
increase in producer surplus and a certain decrease in deadweight loss, which are overall societally beneﬁcial
eﬀects. Whether consumer surplus increases or decreases depends on exactly what prices are charged to
which consumers. In general, the likely eﬀect is that those consumers that live in markets where drug prices
originally were very high, such as the United States, will now be able to purchase drugs for less, increasing
consumer surplus in the more advantaged countries. However, those countries formerly with very low drug
154Note that MEDSA would not have resulted in unfettered reimportation as the countries of import were limited.
28prices will experience an increase in drug costs. Allowing parallel importation may ultimately result no drugs
being sold in developing countries that would otherwise be charged lower prices for the drugs, resulting in
deadweight loss for those entire markets.155 Revising Figure 3, which depicted price discrimination in various
markets, to reﬂect a single global price would yield the following possible results:
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The results of global pharmaceutical pricing are increased consumer surplus in richer nations, decreased
consumer surplus in very poor nations, and a decrease in producer surplus overall.
Though in theory, one might expect drug prices to be reduced signiﬁcantly in the United States if a reim-
portation plan were put in place given the diﬀerential prices between nations, a number of factors could
undermine this result. First, the cost saving derived from parallel trade could potentially be primarily
absorbed by the distributors and middlemen engaged in parallel trading, and secondarily to hospitals and
pharmacists.156 Some commentators believe that consumers would receive little to none of the beneﬁt from
156Barﬁeld & Groombridge, supra note 82, at 250. Recall that the pharmacy industry was a strong supporter of MEDSA.
30parallel trade.157 Second, as noted by Secretary Thompson, under a regime such as MEDSA with costly
safety and labeling requirements, there may only be participation for the most demanded drugs, and the cost
savings may be reduced for the public. Lastly, reimportation itself imposes outside costs, such as shipping
and packaging, which would curb cost savings.
Though the eﬀect of a reimportation policy to lower prices to U.S. consumers is tenuous, a successful eﬀort
to reducing geographic price discrimination would be even worse for global consumers. A shift from a ge-
ographically diﬀerentiated market to a non-diﬀerentiated market will ultimately produce a change in drug
pricing that could lead to lower-end markets out of the picture, generating more societal losses overall.
B.
Innovation
Though it is very diﬃcult to obtain empirical data on the eﬀects of proﬁts and patents on innovation, the
strongest objections to pharmaceutical reimportation is that by lowering industry proﬁts by eliminating
diﬀerential pricing, pharmaceutical innovation will be detrimentally aﬀected. If the revenues fall below the
costs necessary to cover research and development, ﬁrms will not go into the drug-making business. Barﬁeld
and Groombridge argue, “Whatever the individual circumstances, the basic economic fact is that over the
long haul if a ﬁrm is to survive the average costs across all units of production in all markets must be
suﬃcient to cover the average total cost, including the sunk joint costs.”158
In the economic model presented above, price diﬀerentiation enhances social good by providing more in-
centives to producers to innovate while reducing deadweight loss. As Figure 5 shows, the result of a reim-
portation scheme would be to reduce producer surplus and the associated incentives it generates for creation.
C.
Safety
The primary reason that MEDSA and other reimportation measures were not implemented was public
safety. The FDA and pharmaceutical industry argued vehemently that the public would put at great risk
if reimportation were allowed. Following the same reasoning as the PDMA, such fears are primarily based
on the possibility that subpotent or adulterated goods would be allowed to enter the U.S. market. MEDSA
attempts to address this by requiring sampling and testing of each shipment of reimported goods.159 However,
MEDSA relies on a scheme of self-reporting to achieve this goal. Though MEDSA requires suspension of
157Id. at 250.
158Id.
159MEDSA, supra note 1, at § 745(d)(6)(C) - (D).
31importation if a particular importer is found to be shipping goods that are counterfeit or adulterated,160 the
already limited resources of customs in checking drug shipments could likely not be able to properly enforce
such a suspension.
Though the costs of implementing and enforcing proper safety measures are unknown, it is clear that there
is a tradeoﬀ between the degree of reimportation and safety. For instance, MEDSA limited the countries
from which drugs could be reimported in order to limit the sources of potentially unsafe drugs. However,
at the same time this measure was criticized for limited the potential cost savings to consumers for drugs
reimported from low-cost markets. Furthermore, the increase in quantity of reimported drugs would require
an increase in administrative enforcement from the FDA and Customs oﬃcials to ensure safety of the drugs,
cutting into any cost savings that might have been achieved.
D.
Future Issues: The Problem of Illegal Importation for Personal Use
The stories of trips to Mexico and Canada to obtain cheaper drugs are but part of the greater problem of
frustrated individuals and groups who may potentially turn to illegal importation to alleviate the high cost
of drugs. With the rise of internet sales of drugs from international sources, consumers will likely ﬁnd that
access to such drugs easier as time progresses. If such practices proliferate, they may render the PDMA and
the entire reimportation debate obsolete by allowing Americans easy, though illegal, access to foreign drugs
at lower prices.
1.
The Regulation of Pharmaceutical Imports
Currently, pharmaceutical importation is regulated through a number of sources. The FDCA prohibits the
importation of unapproved, misbranded, or adulterated drugs.161 In addition, the PDMA imposes criminal
sanctions for knowing violations of the reimportation ban.162 In response to the need of some patients to
receive potentially life-saving drugs unavailable in the United States, the FDA has a personal importation
policy that allows the exercise of enforcement discretion to allow importation of an unapproved prescription
drug as long as: 1) the product is for less than 90 days of personal use; 2) the product is used to treat a
serious condition with no available eﬀective remedies in the United States; 3) there is no known advertising
to U.S. residents by those distributing the product; 4) the product is not considered unreasonably risky;
5) the patient aﬃrms in writing that the product is for personal use and provides the contact information
of a U.S. doctor responsible for the treatment or provides evidence that the product is for continuation of
treatment started abroad.163
160Id. at § 745(g).
32Custom’s oﬃcials enforce this regime by identifying parcels that may violate the importation bans and deter-
mining whether they should or should not remain in the country. FDA inspectors then notify the recipient
of a potential violation, and allow for a response; if the response is inadequate, the package is returned to the
sender. Sources report that two million packages containing foreign drugs for personal use enter the country
each year.164 Enforcement of drug importation regulations is diﬃcult given the diﬃculty of inspection and
the rise in internet sales.
2.
Online Pharmacies and International Drug Discount Programs
An important issue that is likely to gain prominence in the debate over the high cost of prescription drugs
is the increasing availability of prescription drugs on the internet. According to some estimates, there are
possibly 400 illegal internet sites that sell prescription drugs to Americans without a proper prescription.165
Some online pharmacies, such as Drugstore.com, oﬀer their low prices as an alternative to going across
the border obtain cheaper drugs.166 In 2001, a Canadian internet company announced a venture to oﬀer
Canadian-priced prescription drugs to Americans through an on-line prescription exchange program.167
Online pharmacies have caught the attention of lawmakers concerned with the safety of such drugs.168
Though there are numerous regulations restricting the importation of drugs, many believe that they can-
not eﬀectively address the seriousness of the problem posed by importation through internet sites.169 The
main problem is that these sites can locate abroad where U.S. authorities do not have the power to attack
them directly.170 FDA’s primary enforcement action of writing a cease and desist letter seems of little avail
without possibility of actual punishment.171 Though the diﬃculty of regulating these sites is acknowledged,
the U.S. is not completely powerless in enforcing its laws abroad. The Department of Justice is seeking
the cooperation of other nations in the investigation and prosecution of computer crimes.172 Further, the
government can work with U.S. credit card companies and ﬁnancial institutions to disrupt the illegal sale of
drugs on the web.173
The other way that the U.S. can try to stop the ﬂood of illicit prescription drugs is by curbing the entry
164Conlan, supra note 60, at 32.
165James G. Dickinson, Illegal Internet Rx Sites Up to 400, Med. Marketing and Media, Nov. 1, 2001, at 36.
166Peter Neupert, Lower Drug Prices Can Be Found Online, Bus. Week, Oct. 30, 2000.
167William Langbein, Web Company Oﬀers Drugs in U.S. at Canadian Prices, Yahoo News, Sep. 7, 2001, at
http://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/nm/20010907/hl/drugs 2.html.
168Some online pharmacies simply require the customer to ﬁll out an online evaluation to obtain
the drug. See Kai Wright, Online Pharmacies Evading Regulation, Salon.com, Apr. 17, 2000, at
http://www.salon.com/health/feature/2000/04/17/internet pharmacy/. More legitimate sites require that a doctor or
pharmacist fax the prescription to the online service.
169See, e.g., Wright, supra note 168.
170The U.S. Department of Justice and State attorneys general have instituted a number of lawsuits against illegal online
drug distribution within the U.S. See Statement of Ethan Posner, Deputy Associate Attorney General, U.S. Department of
Justice, Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, U.S. House of Representatives, May 25, 2000, available at
http://www.cybercrime.gov/posner.htm; Wright, supra note 168.
171See id.
172Statement of Ethan Posner, supra note 170.
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33and demand of such drugs. However, the rising number of illegal shipments will likely make searching and
seizing the drugs almost impossible.174 The U.S. Customs Service seized 10,000 packages in 1999 with illicit
prescription drugs, a number four times greater than the previous year.175 Perhaps the most troubling aspect
of internet sales of prescription drugs is the lack of consumer awareness and concern that these drugs may
be misbranded or adulterated.176 Without better enforcement, monitoring, and education, more people in
the United States will undoubtedly turn to such sites to buy cheaper prescription drugs from overseas sources.
V.
Solutions to the Prescription Drug Problem
Instead of a policy that attempts to eliminate price discrimination by allowing reimportation, the govern-
ment should consider ways of providing prescription drugs for the uninsured elderly that do not jeopardize
the proﬁts needed as incentives for pharmaceutical research. The most widely discussed proposal for dealing
with the prescription drug problem is to implement a prescription drug beneﬁt as part of Medicare. However,
a federally sponsored prescription drug subsidy, though better than a reimportation policy, is a crude way
of dealing with the problem that would result in a large waste of resources. Rather, the government should
look, somewhat counter intuitively, towards plans that increase price discrimination such that those without
the ability to pay for drugs may obtain them for lower prices. A price discount plan for the uninsured elderly
has the potential to increase access to drugs without encroaching on pharmaceutical proﬁts. The following
sections will describe the problems with a federally sponsored drug beneﬁt and analyze potential policies for
drug discounts for seniors.
A.
Federally-Sponsored Prescription Drug Beneﬁt
Though proposals to implement a prescription drug beneﬁt as part of Medicare failed in 1999, Congress is
feeling strong pressure to revive the eﬀort. Such a plan would make the federal government and taxpayers
subsidize prescription drugs costs for the uninsured elderly on Medicare. This would undoubtedly be a very
costly entitlement program, which is why Republicans are reluctant to approve of such a plan. A major
174See Statement of Congressman John D. Dingell, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Hearing on Continuing
Concerns over Imported Pharmaceuticals (2001), available at http://www.house.gov/commerce democrats/press107st33.htm
(citing an FDA/Customs Service project in which of 16,000 parcels stopped for illegal importation of drugs, 14,000 were sent
to their destinations without any review).
175Wright, supra note 168.
176See, e.g., id. (describing the lack of consumer complaints about online pharmacies as an indication of consumers’ belief
that such sites are safe and that prescription drugs can be obtained without a prescription).
34drawback to the plan is inevitable leakage—some who do not truly need the discounts will be receiving
them.177 A more ﬁnely tuned plan could serve only the subset of Medicare recipients who do not have
prescription drug coverage, although a process to determine who deserves coverage may be costly to admin-
ister. A second drawback is the political infeasibility of implementing such a plan. Though political pressure
is mounting from the public and pharmaceutical industry to implement such a beneﬁt, Congress has been
extremely reluctant to pass a Medicare drug beneﬁt due to its costs.
An analysis of the potential impacts of a Medicare prescription drug beneﬁt makes it clear why the pharma-
ceutical industry supports it, and why it may be also be a bad idea for policymakers. The following ﬁgure
presents the theoretical result of a federal subsidy for those who cannot aﬀord prescription drugs:
Figure 5: Medicare Prescription Drug Beneﬁt
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As the ﬁgure shows, if the federal government subsidized prescription drugs for those who cannot currently
aﬀord them, it will eradicate the deadweight loss by supplying those who need prescription drugs. However,
the government will be paying a price above many consumers’ willingness to pay, resulting in a net societal
loss of funds and a large subsidy to the pharmaceutical industry (above their monopoly proﬁts in the current
market). Therefore, a government-sponsored prescription drug beneﬁt is likely to be of great cost with little
36societal gain.178 If, on the other hand, the government is able to obtain the additional drugs at low cost
(near or slightly above marginal cost), then there would be no subsidy to the pharmaceutical industry and
the plan would resemble the drug discount policies described below.
B.
Drug Discounts for Uninsured Elderly
1.
General Description
A plan that provides lower prices to uninsured seniors179 yet keeps prices for the insured the same would
allow access to necessary drugs for those who need them the most, while not jeopardizing the proﬁts needed
as incentive for pharmaceutical innovation. The beneﬁts of such a policy over a reimportation or entitlement
policy are manifest. If implemented well, a drug discount plan for uninsured elderly would allow drug
manufacturers to reach out to consumers who could not otherwise be able to aﬀord the drugs or are currently
going across the border to ﬁnd cheaper drugs, in theory rendering no loss of aggregate proﬁts for the
drug companies. Further, assuring safety of reimported drugs would not be an issue, and the complex
infrastructure necessary to implement safety procedures such as those envisioned by MEDSA would not be
necessary, making a discount plan cheaper to the government. Third, the price savings are going speciﬁcally
to the people who need them—the elderly and uninsured—rather than the general public who might otherwise
be able to aﬀord these drugs. Furthermore, in a reimportation plan, it is unclear whether middlemen or the
end consumer would be beneﬁting most from the price diﬀerentials, which would not be the case in a price
discount policy.180 The eﬀects of such a policy are depicted as follows:
Figure 6: One-Tier Price Discounts for Uninsured Seniors
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even greater incentives to innovate, such a subsidy is out of the norm for most industries and is probably goes beyond the point
of beneﬁcial incentive towards societal waste.
179See Hussar, supra note 31, at 10.
180It is possible that pharmacists would try to absorb some of the savings of a price discount program. However, the same
possibility with a reimportation policy, which further introduced another level of middlemen, the parallel importers.
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The diagram shows a hypothetical price discount program within a market of senior citizens in which the
drug companies sell at two prices—the revenue-maximizing price for the insured seniors, and a discount
price for those uninsured seniors that is slightly above the marginal cost of the drug. The diagram, though
simplistic, shows that pharmaceutical industry gain in part from such a policy, consumers would certainly
beneﬁt, and deadweight loss would be reduced.
The primary objection that would undoubtedly be raised by the pharmaceutical industry is that the proﬁts
of the industry depend on sales to those very people who are uninsured. At the same time, those who are
still subject to full prices but have diﬃculty paying will object on fairness grounds that they should have to
pay full price. Empirical research should certainly be conducted to examine exactly who can aﬀord drugs
at what prices. A multi-tiered system of pricing or government subsidy could then be implemented:
Figure 7: Two-Tiered Price Discounts for Uninsured Seniors
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Though multi-tiered plan would be more complex to administer, the point is that the government or indus-
try could potentially come up with a plan that makes drugs more available to consumers by reducing the
ineﬃciencies of monopoly rather than cutting into pharmaceutical proﬁts.
The primary drawbacks of the plan are leakage and arbitrage. The complexity in sorting and diﬀerentiating
who pays what price will inevitably lead to a certain amount of leakage. However, an administrative system
as developed as the Medicare system should be able to sort the diﬀerent types of people and who deserves
which price. The more diﬃcult problem will be one of arbitrage. This could occur in two ways. First, a
black market may develop for drugs that are sold at the low price. This is likely alleviated by the fact that
these drugs may only be obtained with a doctor’s prescription; still, there is a possibility that those without
genuine needs will obtain prescriptions for drugs they can sell cheaply, or worse, those who need the drugs
may sell them to instead to obtain a proﬁt. A second way that arbitrage may occur is that many seniors
that might otherwise be insured may decide not to become insured since they can obtain the lower prices if
uninsured. A careful screening mechanism must be implemented, perhaps through Medicare, to ensure only
those consumers who cannot aﬀord private insurance can obtain the discounts. These mechanisms will likely
add to the costs of such a program.
402.
Price Discount Proposals
The following proposals are diﬀerent measures that might be taken to create a system of price discounts for
uninsured seniors, some of which are currently being implemented or considered:
Price Controls
Price controls are seen by the pharmaceutical industry as a major threat to pharmaceutical proﬁts.
However, a narrowly tailored price control program that provides lower prices drugs to that proportion
of the population that cannot aﬀord them should not severely encroach upon pharmaceutical proﬁts. The
pharmaceutical industry would likely ﬁght price controls tooth and nail. With the attitude of Americans and
many politicians turning against the pharmaceutical industry, such a measure could possibly pass, though
not likely in the near future.
Federal Drug Discount Cards
The Bush Administration has proposed a national prescription drug discount card program for the elderly in
order to curb drug prices without federal appropriations by consolidating existing smaller pharmacy discount
cards programs.181 A GAO report found that such a plan would create savings of only 10% to consumers,
though supporters of a national card argued it would allow card users to be able to gain market power
to bargain with large drug companies.182 An attempt to implement such a plan in 2001 failed due to legal
challenges by the pharmacy industry that HHS did not have authority to establish such a plan.183 Since then
a bill has been proposed in the House to oﬀer comprehensive pharmacy beneﬁts to seniors, H.R. 3626.184
Private Drug Discount Cards
In a clear response to public pressure, a number of major pharmaceutical companies have announced discount
programs of their own for the poor and elderly.185 In early 2002, Pﬁzer announced their “Share Card” which
supplies the elderly a 30-day supply of any drug for $15.186 Eli Lilly followed with its discount card plan
181Amy Goldstein, GAO Tests Value of Drug Discount Cards; Savings Less Than 10%, Study Shows, Wash. Post, Jan. 4,
2002, at A25.
182Id.
183Bush Resurrects Plan for Drug Discount Card, Chain Drug Rev., Mar. 18, 2002, at 1.
184Id.
185Bill Brubaker, Drugmakers Align to Oﬀer Discount Card, Washington Post, Apr. 10, 2002, at E01.
186Adrian Michaels, Pﬁzer Oﬀers Cheap Drugs to US Elderly, FT.com, Jan. 15, 2002, at
http://news.ft.com/ft/gx.cgi/ftc?pagename=View&c=Article&cid=FT3DHHP2IWC. The card does not apply to seniors
living in states that have implemented drug assistance programs. Id.
41allowing low-income elderly a month’s supply of drugs for $12.187 In April of 2002, seven drug manufactur-
ers188 collaborated to oﬀer the “Together Rx Card” in an attempt to streamline the various drug discount
plans oﬀered to low-income Medicare patients, oﬀering over 150 drugs at 20%-40% discount.189 Merck &
Co., in a separate eﬀort, has announced its plan to oﬀer drugs at no cost to low-income households.190 If
these programs eﬀectively provide drugs to the elderly persons who need them, it would be superior to a
government-sponsored program, as the private sector would be absorbing the administrative costs of imple-
mentation. Though there are questions as to whether these plans can get drugs to all the people that need
them, they are an important ﬁrst step in recognizing that making drugs more available does not necessarily
mean threatening the proﬁts and innovativeness of the pharmaceutical industry.
Conclusion
The diﬃculty of high prescription drug prices remains an unsolved issue that will likely be of intense focus
for state and federal politicians in the future.191 The need for political action is great—as public frustration
reaches even higher levels, persons will be more likely to resort to illegal and unsafe means of obtaining drugs.
The recent passage of MEDSA reﬂects the public and Congress’ willingness to look to reimportation of U.S.
manufactured drugs sold abroad as a possible solution to the problem. However, MEDSA’s tenuous aﬀect
on consumer drug prices and consumer safety make it riddled with diﬃculties. Reimportation’s theoretic
results of eliminating geographic price discrimination will have detrimental results for society as a whole
by reducing the incentive for drug manufacturers to innovate. Furthermore, a global pricing system for
pharmaceuticals may create severe consumer losses, especially in developing counties. Lastly, reimportation
of patented goods may be subject to legal challenge under current construction of the exhaustion of rights
principle. Rather than considering reimportation, the government should implement a policy that provides
lower-cost drugs to those who need them the most, the uninsured elderly. A policy of price discounts
for uninsured elderly would improve the prescription drug situation without threatening the incentives for
pharmaceutical innovation, and would lead to greater social beneﬁts overall.
187Ted Griﬃth & Lisa Smith, Lilly to Oﬀer Drug Discounts to Seniors, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 5, 2002, at http://cbs.marketwatch.com/news/story.asp?guid={FCACAEA3-E6AE-4AA4-819E-
7D04B9F5C93D}&symb=PFE&sid=3746&siteid=NYT&dist=NYT&osymb=PFE
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